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THE LOST JUSTIFICATION: WHITE-COLLAR CRIME AND THE
ARGUMENT FOR EXPANDING BRADY RIGHTS
Chris Dernbach*
I. INTRODUCTION
White-collar crime became a high priority for federal prosecutors
beginning in the mid-1970s.1 Watergate, corporate wrongdoing, and
the rise of investigative journalism all contributed to the growing
interest in white-collar crime.2 What was once avoided by the criminal
justice system and placed into regulatory and administrative agencies
has become a top investigative priority for the U.S. Department of
Justice.3 The post-Watergate public attitude and public disclosures of
governmental and corporate misconduct created a ripe climate for the
“discovery” of white-collar crime.4 FBI Director William Webster
remarked in 1980 that white-collar crime must be a number one
priority “because it strikes at the very fiber of our society by
undermining trust and confidence in our political, governmental, and
financial systems.”5 Closer to the present, attitudes following the global
financial crisis and recession, coupled with the notion that lawenforcement disproportionately targets people of color and those of
lower socioeconomic status, create political incentives for the
Department of Justice to emphasize white-collar prosecutions.6 Despite
this rise, most observers agree that white-collar criminal justice “is in
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1 Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting White Collar
Crime: How Far Will the Courts Allow Prosecutors to Go?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 405, 408
(1993).
2 Id.
3 TONY. G. POVEDA, RETHINKING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 132–33 (1994).
4 Id. at 133.
5 Id.
6 Elizabeth E. Joh & Thomas W. Joo, Sting Victims: Third-Party Harms in Undercover
Police Operations, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1339 (2015).
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need of substantial reform,” both to ensure fairness to defendants as
well as adequate deterrence.7
Preceding the rise of white-collar criminal prosecution was the rise
of the plea deal, a legal development that would begin as an
extraordinary method of case resolution for obviously guilty defendants
and would come to envelop upwards of ninety percent of criminal
cases.8 Because this accepted practice has come to dominate the
criminal justice landscape, it is important to have serious discussions
about the protection of rights in that context. Justice Kennedy in
Missouri v. Frye remarked regarding plea bargaining:
Because ours ‘is for the most part a system of pleas, not a
system of trials,’ it is insufficient simply to point to the
guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop that inoculates any
errors in the pretrial process. ‘To a large extent . . . horse
trading [between prosecutor and defense counsel]
determines who goes to jail and for how long. That is what
plea bargaining is. It is not some adjunct to the criminal justice
system; it is the criminal justice system.’9
Justice Kennedy’s analysis exhibits the need to ensure that the plea
bargaining stage of criminal adjudication affords sufficient rights to
criminal defendants. This proposition remains just as true for whitecollar defendants.
One area in which academic and circuit court interest has piqued is
the Brady right to exculpatory evidence. While traditionally serving as
a due process trial right since its inception in 1963, many have argued
for the expansion of Brady material rights into the plea bargaining
context to ensure a fair criminal justice process for the ninety-four to
ninety-seven percent of criminal defendants who plead guilty and never
face the traditional bulwark of criminal justice—the jury trial.10
Without minimizing the importance of this discussion’s outcome to
the traditional criminal defendant, it seems that the expansion of Brady
material to the plea bargaining stage can have special and distinct
implications for a white-collar target or defendant. This Comment will
7

J. Kelly Strader, White Collar Crime and Punishment: Reflections on Michael,
Martha, and Milberg Weiss, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45, 49 (2007).
8 Stephanos Bibas, Designing Plea Bargaining From the Ground Up: Accuracy and
Fairness Without Trials as Backstops, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1058–59 (2016).
9 Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143–44 (2012) (alteration and emphasis in
original).
10 See, e.g., James M. Grossman, Getting Brady Right: Why Extending Brady v.
Maryland’s Trial Right to Plea Negotiations Better Protects a Defendant’s Constitutional
Rights in the Modern Legal Era, 2016 BYU. L. REV. 1525, 1535–36 (2016); Corrina Barrett
Lain, Accuracy Where it Matters: Brady v. Maryland in the Plea Bargaining Context, 80
WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (2002).
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argue that because of the inherent complexity of white-collar criminal
prosecutions, as well as other factors, pressure is exerted on the
defendant to enter into plea agreements. Because of these pressures,
including intricate and vague legal and factual issues, exorbitant costs,
the need for cooperators, and high sentencing guidelines, it is all the
more imperative that we ensure defendants are fully aware of the
circumstances surrounding their plea to ensure a just outcome and a
just legal system.
While much academic interest has been devoted to the expansion
of the Brady trial right to the context of plea bargaining, those arguing
for that expansion are missing an important and compelling piece of
their argument, which exists in the white-collar context.11 Academic
work seems to either discredit the fact that white-collar crime may
create unique justifications or ignores its distinct existence altogether.
While not discrediting arguments for the expansion of Brady in general,
and not claiming that white-collar defendants are more deserving of
such protections, those who argue for Brady expansion would be illadvised to continue to dismiss compelling justifications that exist for
white-collar defendants. It is the purpose of this Comment to present
those justifications.
Part II of this Comment will discuss Brady v. Maryland and its
progeny. This Part will develop an understanding of what a criminal
defendant is entitled to from a due process standpoint and the
underlying reasoning behind the Brady line of cases. This Part will also
track the shift of Brady from its position as purely a trial right into the
realm of plea deals, a practice that encompasses the large majority of
criminal adjudications. It will end with an analysis of the circuit split
concerning whether the Brady right to exculpatory evidence extends to
the context of plea bargaining.
Part III of this Comment will discuss the rise of the plea deal as the
workhorse of American criminal adjudication. This Part will also
discuss some of the potential reasons for that development.
Part IV of this Comment will discuss distinct considerations that
arise in the context of white-collar crime. This Part will explain that
white-collar crime is inherently complex, and stemming from that
11 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 8, at 1063 (mentioning white-collar defendants only to
say that they “can afford great lawyers and thorough investigations” and, therefore,
implying that the white-collar defendants concerns are minimized); Grossman, supra
note 10, at 1535–36 (discussing DNA-based exonerations and wrongful convictions
concerning death-row inmates obviating the need for expansion of Brady into the
context of plea deals); Lain, supra note 10 (discussing expansion generally with no
mention of white-collar crime); Petegorsky, infra note 29, at 3601 (arguing for the
expansion of Brady material to plea bargaining through the lens of a robbery case).
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complexity are a host of considerations that inform the white-collar
space and create unique justifications for expanding the rights of whitecollar defendants. Particularly, the complexity of these crimes leads to
a “white-collar rationale” by which courts have been willing to erode
some protections of white-collar defendants, particularly in the area of
investigation, because of the difficulty of prosecuting such crimes.12
Likewise, white-collar complexity leads to vague actus reus elements,
confusing mens rea elements, and prohibitive costs, all of which exert
pressure on the white-collar defendant to resolve litigation as quickly as
possible.13 Lastly, the exorbitantly high Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
particularly for economic crimes, make any “choice” of whether or not
to plead guilty dangerously close to coercion.14 The high guidelines,
coupled with the practice of overcharging, exert even more pressure on
the defendant to accept a better deal over risking the “trial penalty.”15
Parallel issues certainly exist outside of the white-collar context, raising
similar, if not worse, concerns.16 These issues are highlighted here in
the context of white-collar crime, however, because while concerns have
been extensively addressed in the context of traditional crime, or
criminal law in general, white-collar crime has received comparatively
less focus.
Part V of this Comment will explain how these distinct
considerations inform the need for Brady exculpatory evidence in the
context of plea deals.
II. BRADY AND ITS PROGENY: FROM TRIAL TO PLEA DEALS
In the seminal case, Brady v. Maryland, Brady and a companion,
Boblit, faced trial for first-degree murder.17 Brady admitted to
involvement in the crime but denied participating in the physical killing,
implicating Boblit as the actual killer.18 Brady admitted guilt to first12

Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 115–16 (1988).
Sarah Ribstein, A Question of Costs: Considering Pressure on White-Collar Criminal
Defendants, 58 DUKE L.J. 857, 867 (2009).
14 NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT
TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE IT 6 (2018), https://www.nacdl.org/
getattachment/95b7f0f5-90df-4f9f-9115-520b3f58036a/the-trial-penalty-the-sixthamendment-right-to-trial-on-the-verge-of-extinction-and-how-to-save-it.pdf
[hereinafter THE TRIAL PENALTY].
15 Id.
16 See, e.g., Danielle Snyder, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Look at the Disproportionate
Effects of Federal Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences on Racial Minorities and How They
Have Contributed to the Degradation of the Underprivileged African-American Family, 36
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 77 (2015).
17 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963).
18 Id.
13
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degree murder and asked only that the jury not return the death
penalty.19 Nonetheless, the jury returned a verdict of capital
punishment.20
Before the trial, Brady’s attorney asked to examine statements
made by Boblit.21 Several were examined, but the prosecution withheld
a particular statement.22 In the withheld statement, Boblit admitted to
the physical killing.23 Brady did not learn of the statement until after his
trial, conviction, sentencing, and unsuccessful appeal.24
The Supreme Court held that “suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”25 This holding was not
untrodden ground, but rather an expansion of a line of earlier cases that
expressed the desire for our society to ensure a truly fair trial system.26
The Court explained that society’s goal is not merely to ensure that the
guilty are convicted but also to ensure that our nation has a justice
system with an overarching principle of fairness.27 Justice Douglas,
writing for a 7-2 majority, expressed this concern by stating, “our
system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is
treated unfairly.”28 The Brady holding organically transformed from a
constitutional due process right into a prosecutorial discovery
obligation on the government to provide such evidence at the trial phase
of a criminal adjudication.29
Giglio v. United States expanded the Brady rule to impeachment
evidence.30 The Supreme Court in Giglio held that where guilt or
innocence turns on the reliability of a witness, nondisclosure of
19

Id.
Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Brady, 373 U.S. at 84.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 87.
26 See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (holding that even when the state
does not solicit the false evidence, if the prosecutor allows it to go uncorrected a
violation of due process will result); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112–13 (1935)
(holding that the government’s knowing use of perjured testimony and suppression of
evidence favorable to the defendant resulted is a violation of Constitutional rights).
27 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
28 Id.
29 Michael Nasser Petegorsky, Plea Bargaining in the Dark: The Duty to Disclose
Exculpatory Brady Evidence During Plea Bargaining, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3599, 3604
(2013).
30 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
20
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impeachment evidence for that witness falls under the Brady rule and is
a violation of due process.31 In other words, the due process
requirement for Brady material at trial encompasses both exculpatory
evidence and impeachment evidence under certain circumstances.
The Court furthered the prosecutorial discovery obligation in
United States v. Agurs, in which it held that material evidence of
substantial value to the defendant must be turned over, even absent a
specific request by the defense for such material.32 The Court based its
conclusion on what it called “elementary fairness,” finding that while the
prosecutor has a duty to earnestly prosecute the accused, the people’s
overriding interest is in a just outcome.33 The prosecutor “is the ‘servant
of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer.’”34 This role requires the prosecutor to turn over
Brady material even if the defendant does not ask for it, a departure
from the adversarial practice of law in the name of justice.35
The Supreme Court in United States v. Bagley refined the standard
for Brady material by finding that evidence is “material” for Brady
purposes if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed, the result of a proceeding may have been different.36 In other
words, withholding evidence only violates due process when such
evidence has a reasonable probability of changing the outcome.37 Kyles
v. Whitley further refined the materiality standard by holding that the
standard does not require that the defendant would have been acquitted
had the evidence been disclosed, but the suppression must only
“undermine[] confidence in the outcome of the trial.”38
Throughout the development of the Brady rule, the Court’s
overarching concern remained the fairness of the judicial system.39 The
impact on defendants and the fairness of trials remained the principal

31

Id.
427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976).
33 Id. at 110.
34 Id. at 111 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
35 Id. at 107.
36 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
37 Id.
38 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).
39 See, e.g., Bagley, 473 U.S. at 693 (White, J., concurring) (“With a minimum of effort,
the state could improve the real and apparent fairness of the trial enormously, by
assuring that the defendant may place before the trier of fact favorable evidence known
to the government.”).
32
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focus.40 These justifications have featured prominently in the
arguments over the expansion of Brady to the plea deal context.41
III. THE RISE OF THE PLEA DEAL
Plea bargains have come to encompass a massive proportion of
criminal cases. Between ninety-four and ninety-seven percent of
criminal cases in the United States are resolved through a guilty plea.42
At the federal level, their acceptance is enshrined in Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11, which states, “[a]n attorney for the government
and the defendant’s attorney, or the defendant when proceeding pro se,
may discuss and reach a plea agreement.”43 Further, in an unrelated
case also entitled Brady v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the
guilty plea was a constitutional mechanism for criminal justice
adjudication.44 The Court reasoned:
We cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the State to
extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a
substantial benefit to the State and who demonstrates by his
plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime and to
enter the correctional system in a frame of mind that affords
hope for success in rehabilitation over a shorter period of time
than might otherwise be necessary. . . . A contrary holding
would require the States and Federal Government to forbid
guilty pleas altogether . . . . The Fifth Amendment does not
reach so far.45
The prevalence of plea bargaining has come to the point of nearly
inescapable prominence; the practice is here to stay.46 More than ninety
percent of the time, plea bargaining is the end of a criminal adjudication,
making that stage the final opportunity to protect the defendant’s
rights.47

40

See, e.g., Agurs, 427 U.S. at 116 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Our overriding concern
in cases such as the one before us is the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”).
41 Petegorsky, supra note 29, at 3613 (“General appeals to fairness motivate the
desire for Brady disclosure during plea bargaining as well: if the true goal of the criminal
process is justice, then a prosecutor’s suppression of exculpatory evidence to coerce a
defendant to plead guilty directly contravenes that goal.”).
42 Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining: The Impact
of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 562 (2014).
43 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1).
44 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970).
45 Id.
46 But see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037,
1037 (1984) (arguing that the “pervasively important assumption” that plea bargaining
is necessary and inevitable is mistaken).
47 Lain, supra note 10, at 49.

DERNBACH (DO NOT DELETE)

498

11/5/2020 10:22 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:491

American plea bargaining began as a tool for prosecutors to
dispose of cases and eventually gained traction with judges, creating a
dynamic where “all of the system’s power-holders” shared an interest in
plea bargaining.48 Professional prosecutors were rare in colonial
America.49 As they became more commonplace, defense attorneys
likewise became more common, the rules of evidence became more
formalized, and trials went from lasting minutes to lasting days.50 These
factors created a packed docket, convincing many judges to accept guilty
pleas.51 By 1900, the rate of guilty pleas was close to ninety percent and
the plea bargaining system had cemented its place in American criminal
practice.52
As early as 1920, observers commented on the
disappearance of the jury trial.53 Plea bargaining has now reached a
point in the twenty-first century where some jurisdictions have few, if
any, criminal trials.54 But because the plea bargain began as an
exceptional process, a way for certainly guilty defendants to expedite
their cases and save the hassle of reaching an obvious conclusion, the
legal system did not attempt to include safeguards into the system.55
This lack of safeguards in an adjudication mechanism with such
prominence creates concern over a potential lack of justice in the
American criminal justice system.56
Professional prosecutors are not the only force credited with
spurring the rise of the guilty plea. Several factors contributed to the
preeminence of plea bargaining, and the preeminence of plea bargaining

48 George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 1016 (2000); see also
Bibas, supra note 8, at 1059.
49 Emily Yoffe, Innocence is Irrelevant, ATLANTIC (Sep. 2017), https://www.the
atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/innocence-is-irrelevant/534171.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 See id.
53 Fisher, supra note 48, at 859.
54 Alkon, supra note 42, at 562.
55 Bibas, supra note 8, at 1059; see also THE TRIAL PENALTY, supra note 14 (arguing
that the jury trial was established as a means of protecting against the tyranny of
government and ensuring that the protections of the Constitution were not trampled,
but the rise of the guilty plea serves no similar purpose of transparency and
accountability).
56 While this article will focus exclusively on the American criminal justice system,
it is worth mentioning that the expansion of plea bargaining has become a global affair.
See Robert Hanson, Plea Bargains Save Time and Money, But Are Too Easily Abused,
ECONOMIST (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/11/09/pleabargains-save-time-and-money-but-are-too-easily-abused (showing that of ninety
countries studied in 1990, only sixteen permitted plea bargaining, but by 2017, sixty-six
of them did).
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necessarily created the shirking of the jury trial. Fisher’s take on this
outcome is quite glum:
There is no glory in plea bargaining. In place of a noble clash
for truth, plea bargaining gives us a skulking truce. Opposing
lawyers shrink from battle, and the jury’s empty box signals
the system’s disappointment. But though its victory merits no
fanfare, plea bargaining has triumphed. Bloodlessly and
clandestinely, it has swept across the penal landscape and
driven our vanquished jury into small pockets of resistance.
Plea bargaining may be, as some chroniclers claim, the
invading barbarian. But it has won all the same. . . . Like most
of history’s victors, plea bargaining won in great part because
it served the interests of the powerful.57
Aside from his mournful prose, Fisher’s analysis demonstrates that the
guilty plea has overtaken the criminal justice system. His analysis and
implicit disapproval are not new, nor without concurrence. The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the 1877 case, Wight v. Rindskopf, stated
that pleas are an encroachment on the role of the judiciary and “hardly,
if at all, distinguishable in principle from a direct sale of justice.”58 Still
today, plea bargaining continues to be extensively criticized by
academics, jurists, and advocates.59 But what caused such a dynamic is
likely a web of factors.
Some argue that the expansion of the criminal justice system
spurred the rise of the guilty plea.60 “[T]he criminal-justice system has
become a ‘capacious, onerous machinery that sweeps everyone in,’ and
plea bargains, with their swift finality, are what keep that machinery
running smoothly.”61 Because of the vast expansion of the criminal
justice system, the only way to keep it functioning is to adjudicate a
majority of cases through plea bargaining; the system simply could not
operate without the guilty plea.62 This preeminence, and the harsh
consequences that may come with conviction at trial, means that it may
be a rational choice to plead guilty to a crime of which you are innocent,
avoiding the jury trial altogether and eroding the quintessential
defender of innocence.63
57

Fisher, supra note 48, at 859.
43 Wis. 344, 354 (1877).
59 Dylan Walsh, Why U.S. Criminal Courts Are So Dependent On Plea Bargaining,
ATLANTIC (May 2, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/pleabargaining-courts-prosecutors/524112.
60 Yoffe, supra note 49.
61 Id.
62 See Gretchen Gavett, The Problem with Pleas, PBS FRONTLINE (Oct. 31, 2011),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-problem-with-pleas.
63 Id.
58
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Others argue that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines strongly
contribute to the downfall of the jury trial. According to the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the exorbitant sentences
imposed by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, particularly for
economic crimes under Section 2B1.1, make any choice of whether to
plead guilty or go to trial purely illusory, because the “trial penalty” of a
jury conviction is too high to risk.64 In other words, a cost-benefit
analysis supplants guilt or innocence as the determinant of whether or
not many defendants will plead guilty.65 Likewise a function of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the practice of overcharging has been
named as a reason for the acceptance of guilty pleas.66 The charging
decisions of prosecutors are largely immune from any formal process of
legal review.67 Through this process of filing additional charges or
excess counts, the prosecutor creates leverage in plea negotiations and
makes the eventual plea offer seem more attractive.68 Consequently,
more plea deals are made, and fewer jury trials take place.
It is worth noting that some recognize that plea bargaining is not
inherently one-sided. Both the prosecutor and the defendant generally
have some bargaining power to exercise that will help their outcome.69
The prosecutor is practically limited in his or her ability to bring cases
to trial. The basic constraints on time mean that only a fraction of cases
can go to trial.70 Likewise, the burden of proof in criminal trials means
that the prosecutor must grapple with the reality that he or she may not
be able to present evidence sufficient to obtain a conviction.71 The
prosecutor, however, can decide the charges, and decide the sentence
recommendation to the judge, giving him immense power over the
process.72 The prosecutor also may face administrative pressures to
dispose of cases efficiently, meaning that if a defendant wishes to bring
a case to trial, the prosecutor may have to decide whether or not that
64

See THE TRIAL PENALTY, supra note 14, at 343.
See Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Innocence: Irrelevant in the High Stakes Risk
Game, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 77, 84 (2009).
66 Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L. REV.
1303, 1304 (2018) (“As plea bargaining scholars have long recounted, prosecutors’
ability to threaten inflated sentences, combined with their power to trade those
sentences away for pleas of guilt, allows them to control ‘who goes to prison and for how
long.’”).
67 Brian D. Johnson, Plea-Trial Differences in Federal Punishment: Research and Policy
Implications, 31 FED. SENT. R. 256, 258 (2019).
68 Id.
69 Kenneth Kipnis, Criminal Justice and the Negotiated Plea, 86 ETHICS 93, 93 (1976).
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 94.
65
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trial will be effectual.73 As Justice White recognized in Brady v. United
States, the criminal defendant can receive a substantial benefit from a
guilty plea in exchange for giving a substantial benefit to the state.74
Both sides typically have bargaining power, though problems with plea
bargaining persist.
Regardless of the underlying reason or coalition of reasons
spurring the rise of guilty pleas, the American criminal justice system
has accepted the practice as the workhorse of criminal adjudication,
though its participants and supposed beneficiaries may mourn with
Professor Fisher. This dynamic creates a need in American criminal law
to take rights that traditionally only existed in the case of the jury trial
and find ways to ensure that the same issues are addressed in the
context of plea bargaining so that the same unfairness may be avoided.
A. Brady in the Context of Plea Deals
Despite the vast criticisms of the plea bargaining process and
abundance of calls for reform,75 some circuit courts have balked at the
opportunity to expand the rights of criminal defendants in this context.
Circuit courts are split over whether or not the prosecutor’s duty to turn
over Brady material applies in the context of plea deals or is confined to
the realm of the jury trial.76 The Supreme Court fueled this debate in its
2002 decision in United States v. Ruiz.77 In that case, the Supreme Court
placed a major limitation on Brady rights, but only on the expansion of
Brady that came out of Giglio.78 The Court held that a defendant’s due
process rights were not violated when a prosecutor failed to disclose
impeachment evidence prior to the entry of a guilty plea.79 This holding
did not explicitly encompass the traditional Brady exculpatory
evidence.80 As such, circuits post-Ruiz have created a split over whether
due process is violated by a prosecutor’s failure to disclose material
exculpatory evidence prior to the entry of a guilty plea.81
The first appellate court to address that issue was the Seventh
Circuit, and they reasoned in favor of expansion in McCann v.
Mangialardi.82 While lacking the opportunity to actually decide the
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id. at 93–94.
397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970).
See Walsh, supra note 59.
Grossman, supra note 10, at 1529.
536 U.S. 622 (2002).
Id. at 631.
Id. at 625.
Grossman, supra note 10, at 1529.
Id.
337 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2003).
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issue of whether the right to Brady exculpatory evidence exists in the
context of a plea deal, the Seventh Circuit found that the language used
by the Supreme Court in Ruiz strongly suggested that if exculpatory
evidence were withheld, a violation of due process would result.83 They
based this finding on the Supreme Court’s distinction between
impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence, with the former being
difficult to characterize as “critical information of which the defendant
must always be aware prior to pleading guilty.”84
The Tenth Circuit followed suit in United States v. Ohiri, largely
agreeing with the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in McCann.85 The court
here again relied on the distinctions drawn in Ruiz between
impeachment information and exculpatory evidence.86 Based on that
separate treatment, the Seventh Circuit found that Ruiz was not
intended to apply to exculpatory evidence, but only to impeachment
information. Because the evidence in Ohiri was exculpatory, the
defendant could mount a Brady challenge.87
Opposing the reasoning of the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, other
circuits have held that the Brady right to exculpatory evidence, like the
right to impeachment evidence implicated in Ruiz, does not exist in the
plea bargaining context. In perhaps the strongest rejection of such an
expansion, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Conroy flatly rejected the
argument that the Supreme Court’s limitation to impeachment evidence
in Ruiz implied that exculpatory evidence was on a different footing and
could give rise to a Brady challenge to a guilty plea.88 The Fifth Circuit
held that the entry of a guilty plea precluded the defendant from
challenging on Brady grounds.89
In Friedman v. Rehal, the Second Circuit took up the issue and also
found that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ruiz would apply to both
impeachment and exculpatory evidence.90 The Second Circuit explained
that the Supreme Court “has consistently treated exculpatory and
impeachment evidence in the same way for the purpose of defining the
obligation of a prosecutor to provide Brady material prior to trial.”91
Because of this undifferentiated treatment, the court found that the

83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Id. at 787–88.
Id. at 787.
133 Fed. Appx. 555 (10th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 562.
Id.
567 F.3d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 2009).
Id.
618 F.3d 142, 154 (2d. Cir. 2010).
Id.
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holding in Ruiz would likely apply to exculpatory evidence as well.92
Nonetheless, the court did not have the opportunity to reach the
question because the evidence at issue in Friedman, which involved the
fact that one witness was hypnotized to help him recall information, fit
squarely within the category of impeachment evidence.93
The Fourth Circuit, much like the Second, did not have the
opportunity to reach the Brady issue.94 The court did, however, strongly
indicate that they would agree with the Fifth Circuit that the right to
Brady material did not exist in the context of a guilty plea. The court cast
the Brady right as purely a trial right.95 The purpose of the right,
according to the court, was to “preserve the fairness of a trial verdict and
to minimize the chance that an innocent person would be found
guilty.”96 The court noted that when a defendant pleads guilty, the
concerns of an innocent conviction are “almost completely eliminated
because his guilt is admitted.”97 This dicta strongly indicates that the
Fourth Circuit would hold that the Brady right does not attach to the
entry of a guilty plea.
In light of this circuit split, and the overwhelming proportion of
criminal adjudications taking place via plea bargain, rather than through
a trial, expansion of traditional trial rights, like Brady, outside of the trial
context is increasingly important.98 Such an expansion would not be
without precedent, as the Supreme Court has, as recently as 2012,
expanded other traditional “trial rights” to the context of plea
bargaining.99 As the remainder of this Comment will show, such an
expansion is uniquely important in the white-collar context, and such
arguments should not be ignored by those who favor the expansion of
Brady.
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Id.
Id. at 153.
94 United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 286 (4th Cir. 2010).
95 Id. at 285.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 See Grossman, supra note 10, at 1536 (arguing that the Brady rule is useless to
most defendants because “an overwhelming number of cases never reach trial. Thus,
Brady cannot help the supermajority of defendants” who plead guilty).
99 See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145
(2012) (expanding the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel to the
plea bargaining context).
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IV. DISTINCT CONSIDERATIONS IN WHITE-COLLAR CASES
In order to analyze the implications of plea deal Brady material in
the context of white-collar crime, it is first important to engage in a
surface level discussion about the definition of white-collar crime.
Edwin Sutherland is credited with coining the term “white collar crime”
in a speech to the American Sociological Society in 1939.100 He later
defined the term to mean “a crime committed by a person of
respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation.”101
Sutherland, however, operated in the field of Sociology, and thus did not
seek to create a legal definition of use to this current analysis.102 His
focus was entirely theoretical; he hoped to create a better
understanding of criminal behavior.103
Herbert Edelhertz attempted to remedy this deficiency and helped
guide the term’s shift into the legal space by defining white-collar crime
as “an illegal act or series of illegal acts committed by nonphysical means
and by concealment or guile, to obtain money or property, to avoid the
payment or loss of money or property, or to obtain business or personal
advantage.”104 Because Edelhertz was the former head of the Fraud
Section of the U.S. Department of Justice, this definition was influential
in how the Justice Department would come to define white-collar crime
in the 1970s.105 Particularly distinct in Edelhertz’s definition is the
removal of the personal element, which Sutherland employed. In other
words, Edelhertz identified only the offense, without characterizing the
offender.
The FBI’s White-Collar Crime subsection of its website states that
such crimes are “characterized by deceit, concealment, or violation of
trust and are not dependent on the application or threat of physical
force or violence. The motivation behind these crimes is financial—to
obtain or avoid losing money, property, or services or to secure a
personal or business advantage.”106 The FBI website goes on to
establish several criminal acts that lend themselves to the white-collar
100

POVEDA, supra note 3, at 31.
EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION 7 (1983).
102 James William Coleman, The Theory of White-Collar Crime From Sutherland to the
1990s in WHITE-COLLAR CRIME RECONSIDERED 53 (Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd eds.,
1992).
103 Id.
104 HERBERT EDELHERTZ, NAT’L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT & CRIM. JUSTICE, THE NATURE,
IMPACT, AND PROSECUTION OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 3 (1970).
105 POVEDA, supra note 3, at 40.
106 FBI, White Collar Crime, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/white-collar-crime
(last visited October 28, 2019).
101

DERNBACH (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

11/5/2020 10:22 PM

COMMENT

505

context, including “public corruption, money laundering, corporate
fraud, securities and commodities fraud, mortgage fraud, financial
institution fraud, bank fraud and embezzlement, fraud against the
government, election law violations, mass marketing fraud, and health
care fraud.”107
Some choose to define white-collar crime by reference to what it is
not. One such formulation by a law professor states:
A white collar offense is one that does not necessarily involve
the use or threat of physical force, either against the victim or
the victim’s property. Nor does “white collar crime”
encompass offenses directly related to the possession, sale, or
distribution of controlled substances. The term “white collar
crime” also excludes crime directly related to organized crime
activities. Finally, “white collar crime” excludes laws relating
to certain policy-driven areas such as immigration, civil rights,
and national security, and excludes common theft crimes. This
definition of white collar crime is a broad one, encompassing
offenses from simple fraud using the mail and wires to local
political corruption cases and sophisticated securities and tax
cases.108
This formulation creates another definition focusing on the crime itself
to the exclusion of any consideration of the offender.
One dictionary definition reads “crime that typically involves
stealing money from a company and that is done by people who have
important positions in the company: crime committed by white-collar
workers.”109 This definition, while arguably not far from Sutherland’s
original definition, certainly does not create a useful benchmark for
analysis. Merriam-Webster likewise has a legal definition of “whitecollar crime,” which reads, “crime that is committed by salaried
professional workers or persons in business and that usually involves a
form of financial theft or fraud (as in securities dealing).”110 This
definition is also both underinclusive and overinclusive.
There is no widely accepted definition of white-collar crime.111
Definitions focusing on the offender can potentially lend themselves to
bias and prejudice. Those focusing only on the offense will be both over
107

Id.
Kelly Strader, The Judicial Politics of White Collar Crime, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1199,
1209–10 (1999).
109 White-Collar Crime, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/white-collar%20crime (last visited Oct. 30, 2019).
110 Id.
111 Gerald Cliff & Christian Desilets, White Collar Crime: What It Is and Where It’s
Going, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS PUB. POL’Y 481, 482 (2014).
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and under-inclusive. It is beyond the purpose of this Comment to
develop a comprehensive and usable definition of white-collar crime.
Suffice it to say that it is important for the reader to have a common
sense understanding of what is typically considered to be white-collar
crime, and what, for lack of a better term, this Comment will refer to as
traditional crime (non-white-collar crime).
The Supreme Court and lower courts have never treated
defendants’ Brady rights differently based upon the type of crime
committed, be it a traditional crime or a white-collar crime. Traditional
crime defendants and white-collar defendants, in theory, possess the
same rights, adjusting for the circuit in which they are charged. But
while the need for exculpatory evidence may seem obvious in the
traditional crime context, such a need in white-collar crime is not as
intuitive.112 For traditional criminal defendants, Brady material may
consist of a confirmed alibi,113 another person’s confession,114 a blood
sample that does not match the defendant,115 or a whole host of other
items that may lead to a moment of courtroom drama. A white-collar
defendant’s Brady material may not be as strikingly obvious and, hence,
has attracted less academic interest.116 Nonetheless, the need for
Brady’s expansion in the plea deal context of a white-collar prosecution
is just as necessary for the preservation of a fair criminal justice system
and presents unique considerations that justify such expansion. These
justifications present an important and compelling piece of the
argument that such expansion must take place, and those who argue in
favor of such an expansion would be mistaken to continue ignoring it.
The white-collar defendant is faced with systematic differences
that arise out of the nature of the crime involved. The Supreme Court in
Braswell v. United States found that prosecution of white-collar crime is
inherently difficult.117 Because of this inherent difficulty, the Court
noted their apprehension about affording broader rights to white-collar
targets during the investigation stage.118 This “White Collar Rationale”
favors the government at the expense of white-collar targets and
112 Some have also stated that people simply do not care about fairness for whitecollar defendants. Walter Pavlo, Can White-Collar Defendant’s Get a Fair Trial?, FORBES
(Dec. 19, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2012/12/19/can-whitecollar-defendants-get-a-fair-trial/#11cdfb58590a.
113 Dennis v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 2016).
114 Michael Hanline, CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://californiainnocenceproject.org/
read-their-stories/michael-hanline (last visited October 30, 2019).
115 People v. Murphy, 128 A.D.2d 177, 186 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
116 See supra text accompanying note 11.
117 Henning, supra note 1, at 410.
118 See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 115–16 (1988).
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defendants by avoiding proscriptions on government power that will
allow the already difficult task of prosecuting white-collar crime to
become even harder.119 The same complexity recognized by the Court
in Braswell ultimately pervades the white-collar space to the extent that
it creates unique justifications for the expansion of Brady rights. While
being useful to the prosecutor from a practical perspective, it serves as
a justification for those advocating for the expansion of Brady rights to
the plea bargaining stage.
The complexity of white-collar prosecution creates an independent
factor that lends itself to the proposition that Brady rights are
particularly necessary in the white-collar space. White-collar criminal
prosecution involves intricate factual and legal issues, a dynamic that
has particular importance for the Brady analysis. White-collar crime is
inherently more complex than traditional crime, and evidence of
wrongdoing is often concealed in mountains of discovery.120
Additionally, the issues involved in white-collar crime are significantly
different from those involved in the context of traditional crime.121
In a white-collar case, it may be less clear whether the defendant
committed a crime.122 This uncertainty grants the prosecutor greater
discretion on whether to charge and what to charge, increasing the
prosecutor’s bargaining power over white-collar targets.123 This
increased bargaining power can manifest itself as pressure on the
white-collar defendant to plead guilty.124 Samuel Buell identified two
ways in which the criminal justice system responded to the difficulties
of white-collar prosecution, both of which create concerns for targets.125
First, he argues that white-collar statutes are open-ended, refusing to
define criminal behavior with any specificity so as to remain flexible for
“innovative wrongdoing.”126 Others have referred to this concept as an
“over-criminalization” that is the “product of vague, duplicative, and
sometimes incomprehensible criminal statutes that aggressive
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Henning, supra note 1, at 410.
Id. at 408.
121 Ribstein, supra note 13; see also Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an
Adversarial System: Lessons From Current White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model,
8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 165 (2004) (recognizing that other commentators have discussed
the immense power of federal prosecutors and the current status of white-collar
criminal prosecutions allows federal prosecutors to act as gods).
122 Ribstein, supra note 13.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1628
(2007).
126 Id.
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prosecutors apply to an ever-widening array of circumstances.”127 This
furthers the dynamic of prosecutorial discretion that leads to increased
bargaining power and pressure on white-collar targets and defendants
to plead guilty. Secondly, white-collar prosecution places a strong
emphasis on mental state, in part because of the ambiguous actus reus
elements.128 Because white-collar statutes contain uncertain actus reus
elements that are malleable to innovation, the concern will largely focus
on the mens rea of the individual involved.
White-collar defendants themselves may not even know whether
or not they have broken the law.129 Particularly in the corporate context,
mens rea can be even more challenging because decision-making may
be more diffuse.130 In the traditional crime context, the defendant often
has the best sense of whether or not he or she is guilty, which, despite
inadequacies in the criminal justice system disadvantaging defendants
which are beyond the scope of this Comment, can serve as a safeguard
to the entry of an innocent guilty plea.131 For the white-collar defendant,
the uncertainty and fear of what a jury may infer about his or her mental
state can be a daunting gamble that he or she is simply unwilling to make
when a guilty plea will come with less jarring punitive consequences.
Because of this emphasis on mens rea, which is more central to a
white-collar prosecution, the defendant has more uncertainty, and thus,
some might be more likely to adopt a cost-benefit analysis, rather than
a guilt-innocence analysis.132 A prosecution turning on mens rea “can
be more difficult to anticipate, harder to defend against, and more likely
to produce error by the fact finder.”133 While the white-collar target or
defendant will, of course, know the mental state he possessed during the
event or series of events in question, he will likely be unaware of how
that mental state comports with the law and whether or not the actual
acts he took were criminal in nature.134 He is even less informed of what
the fact-finder will infer about his or her mental state. The white-collar
127

Strader, supra note 7.
Buell, supra note 125.
129 Ribstein, supra note 13, at 865.
130 Id. at 866.
131 But see Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV.
1065, 1114 (2015).
132 See Podgor, supra note 65.
133 Samuel W. Buell, Is the White Collar Offender Privileged?, 63 DUKE L.J. 823, 841
(2014).
134 See Ribstein, supra note 13, at 869 (noting that while traditional crime may have
mens rea requirements of “knowledge” or “purpose” that are straightforward and welldefined, white-collar crime may be accompanied by mens rea requirements such as
“willfulness,” “bad purpose,” or “consciousness of wrongdoing” which creates more
difficult issues).
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defendant may not even have the bare protection of being convinced of
his or her guilt or innocence, opening the door for innocent guilty pleas
through a mechanism not present in the traditional criminal context.
The standards used in white-collar crime are also newer and less
settled than those in the traditional criminal context. They do not come
with extensive case law and can leave a legitimate question over
whether a given course of conduct is legal or criminally punishable.135
Subtle differences create the line between standard business practice
and crime,136 and when wrongdoing does exist, it is often surrounded by
a host of lawful and productive activities.137 As a whole, the substantive
law underlying white-collar prosecutions is less favorable to defendants
than it is in traditional crime.138
The costs of white-collar criminal defense are also prohibitively
high, yet again due to the complexity of the issues involved in such
prosecutions.139 The white-collar defendant cannot mount a sufficient
defense without digging into the complex legal and factual issues that
have been discussed. To effectively grapple with these issues, the whitecollar defense attorney must undertake extensive discovery,
investigation, and fact-finding. The defense attorney must also comb
through massive amounts of discovery produced by the government
that is likely the result of an extensive investigation undertaken by
multiple federal agencies. All of this translates to costing an inordinate
amount of an attorney’s time, which translates to costing an inordinate
amount of money for the defendant.140 By criminalizing behavior that is
ambiguous, complex, and unclear, white-collar statutes ensure that
defense of such claims is difficult, thereby ensuring that it is expensive,
thereby ensuring that pressure is exerted on the white-collar defendant
to avoid as much expense as possible, which will often mean a guilty
plea. Furthermore, prosecutorial resources in white-collar cases, and
more narrowly in financial fraud cases, are more plentiful, meaning that
the white-collar defendant must attempt to compete.141
While sympathy for costs is typically not considered a significant
concern for the white-collar criminal defendant, it certainly informs the
discussion over why it is important to protect defendants’ rights.
Because white-collar defendants are faced with criminal prosecutions
135
136
137
138
139
140
141

See id. at 863–64.
See id.
Buell, supra note 125, at 1627.
Buell, supra note 133, at 888.
See Buell, supra note 125, at 1650.
Ribstein, supra note 13, at 866.
See Strader, supra note 7, at 53.
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that are inherently more expensive to defend, the argument that such
defendants have more money, and that we are therefore less concerned
about their adequate representation, is futile. Most white-collar
defendants cannot afford a proper defense because of the higher costs
involved in defending white-collar crimes.142 The aspect of civil
forfeiture that accompanies the white-collar context may also mean that
criminal defendants are unable to pay their counsel of choice because
their funds are seized by the government as potential proceeds of the
illegal act.143 This high economic cost is not presented to show that the
white-collar defendant is worse off than the traditional criminal
defendant, but rather to show that it is a mistake to dismiss the
protection of white-collar defendants simply because of a
misconception that such persons have the economic resources to
adequately defend themselves. White-collar defendants are likely to be
richer than traditional criminal defendants,144 but relying on those
resources as a justification for ignoring conversation regarding whitecollar reform is a mistaken premise given the greater resources needed
for an adequate defense. Similarly, if one subscribes to one of the
offense-based definitions of white-collar crime, such a discussion would
be futile because white-collar crime under those definitions can cross
socioeconomic boundaries.
Lastly, sentencing guidelines treat the white-collar defendant with
“genuine harshness.”145 Historically, this was not the case. White-collar
offenders were privileged in their sentencing, and “[p]robation,
community service, fines, and short terms of imprisonment followed by
early parole were commonplace.”146 In fact, the issues surrounding
white-collar sentencing were among the chief reasons Congress decided
to endorse the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which today control all
federal sentencing.147
The original guidelines made some movement away from leniency
and parole and toward imprisonment for white-collar offenders.148 This
was largely a measure meant to combat the disparity between
traditional crime and white-collar crime sentences, which was
unjustifiable for a system claiming blind justice and equality of
142

See Ribstein, supra note 13, at 860.
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144 See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
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punishment.149 Amendments in the following decades, however, turned
a corrective measure into an about-face, making the sentencing of
white-collar criminal defendants increasingly harsh.150
Additionally, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in 2002 and was
meant to address corporate crime while also changing the sentencing
framework for white-collar crime.151 The changes affected harsher
sentences for white-collar defendants by including sentencing
enhancements for white-collar offenses that “affect a large number of
victims or endanger the solvency or financial security of publicly traded
corporations, other large employers, or 100 individual victims.”152 The
act also sought to ensure that white-collar offenders would serve time
in federal prisons, rather than half-way houses.153
In Missouri v. Frye, a case dealing with the right to effective
assistance of counsel at the plea bargaining stage, Justice Kennedy
recognized that sentences that may be longer than appropriate appear
on the books mainly because such disconcerting sentences can serve as
a tool for the prosecutor to bargain with, rather than as a judgment by
Congress or the prosecutor that such a sentence is deserved.154 The
combination of prohibitive costs and unnerving sentences amounts to a
form of coercion in which defendants have no financial ability to
effectively defend themselves and win in the face of a massive sentence,
so they must accept the lesser sentence offered in a plea bargain.155
While this Comment is not making a judgment regarding the justice of
American criminal sentencing in either the traditional or white-collar
context, the reality of this exposure does inform the conversation.
V. BRADY, PLEAS, AND THE WHITE-COLLAR CONTEXT
The complexity embedded within the prosecution and defense of
white-collar crime creates pressures on the defendant to enter into
guilty pleas. The actus reus elements are broad. The mens rea elements
are more complex, less defined, and more relied upon, meaning that the
prosecutor will have a harder time proving them, and the defendant will
have more fear that they will be misconstrued. The defendant himself
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may not even know if his or her actions are criminally punishable. These
considerations create a distinct need for Brady material at the plea
bargaining stage of white-collar prosecution. Vague actus reus grants
the prosecutor enormous amounts of discretion that can be exercised in
charging decisions by allowing for “gray-area” prosecutions, which
prosecute “behavior that does not plainly fall within the scope of the
criminal statute.”156 Where wide discretion exists, so too should
protections to counteract that discretion. The expansion of Brady
material to the plea bargaining stage would create an added protective
mechanism that would help to counteract the pressures placed on
defendants to plead guilty. In the white-collar space, where wide
discretion for prosecutors and unique pressures on defendants exists,
this expansion is just as necessary as it is for the traditional criminal
case. Given the argument that substantive white-collar criminal law is
less favorable to defendants than traditional criminal law,157 this may,
in fact, be one area where it is possible to argue that it is even more
imperative to the white-collar defendant that a Brady expansion takes
place.
It is important to note that the analysis of white-collar crime does
not come at the expense of similar arguments for traditional crime, or
criminal law in general. This discussion is meant to highlight a piece of
the rights-expansion argument that has been excluded in academic
focus. The distinct implications for white-collar defendants should not
be equated with an argument that these considerations are superior or
more imperative; they are simply co-existent and parallel. For this
reason, the expansion of Brady into the plea bargaining stage would
serve as an important safeguard on the rights of white-collar
defendants, just as it would for traditional criminal defendants.
Ignoring this importance in favor of a focus on traditional crime
disregards compelling justifications that exist in favor of the expansion
of Brady rights.
The turning over of exculpatory evidence would give the whitecollar defendant a more accurate picture of the outcome of a potential
trial. The issues in white-collar crime are complex and mens rea
focused. Access to exculpatory evidence will give the white-collar
defendant a more accurate outlook on his or her defense, and whether
or not there is a significant chance that his or her mens rea will be
inferred to be criminally culpable.

156
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Turning over exculpatory evidence would also not interfere with
the “White Collar Rationale” espoused by the Court. The White-Collar
Rationale deals with the investigation of white-collar crime. In other
words, it is a recognition by the Court that placing obstacles in the way
of government investigation will create more ways for defendants to
shield their wrongdoing. This important goal would not be impacted by
the expansion of Brady. Brady gives defendants access to government
evidence when it is material and exculpatory. This would in no way
impede the government’s investigation of the crime. By necessity, the
investigation has already happened, and the government simply must
share in the fruits to ensure that justice is done.
The exorbitant costs of defending against a white-collar
prosecution mean that many defendants will have no option but to plead
guilty. While we typically consider white-collar defendants to be
wealthier, the costs involved in defending a long and complex whitecollar trial are extremely high, making it impossible for the average
individual to defend. This dynamic means that the white-collar
defendant is pressured to plead guilty. If the Brady right applied to such
a guilty plea, there would be less concern that an innocent individual
would plead guilty simply by virtue of costs. Provided with exculpatory
evidence, the white-collar defendant may be able to equalize his or her
knowledge with that of the traditional criminal defendant, whose
conscience stands as a barricade to an innocent plea. The white-collar
defendant will often not have the sense of reassurance that his or her
factual innocence will prevail, because he or she may not know that such
factual innocence exists. With exculpatory evidence, the defendant can
better assess the government’s case, which means they can better assess
their guilty plea, resulting in a more favorable plea, a willingness to go
to trial, or the prosecutor dropping charges that cannot be proved. The
alternative is an under-informed guilty plea driven by fear of costs and
harsh sentencing without knowledge of evidence that would tend to
show innocence. Such a dynamic cannot be sustained in a justice system
that is built around the premise of a search for truth.
Exculpatory evidence will also help to lessen the fear imposed on
white-collar defendants by high federal sentencing guidelines. Harsher
sentencing guidelines that came in response to what was perceived to
be unfair leniency to the corporate and white-collar defendant mean
that the possibility for a frightening outcome at trial informs the
defendant’s willingness to plea bargain, exerting pressure on the
defendant and acting as a tool for the prosecutor. In fact, Section 2B1.1
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which deals with economic crimes,
has been particularly criticized for yielding sentences that are
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disproportionate to the culpability of the defendant.158 This section of
the guidelines allows for large sentencing enhancements based on the
amount of loss that occurred or was intended to occur, meaning that a
sentence can be drastically extended based on such monetary results.159
For instance, in a securities fraud case, United States v. Adelson, US
District Court Judge Rakoff recognized that the guidelines would call for
life-imprisonment and stated that such a result showed that the
“guidelines have run so amok that they are patently absurd on their
face.”160 Because of these high sentences, white-collar defendants who
fall under this section, and other white-collar sections as well, face
unnerving pressure to plead guilty. This places extraordinary power in
the hands of prosecutors to obtain guilty pleas. This is exhibited
through the thorough documentation of the practice of overcharging as
a tool for plea negotiations.161 Through access to exculpatory evidence,
the white-collar defendant will have a better sense of what charges have
the possibility of sticking, and which do not. He or she will know that
certain charges are impossible to pursue and have information relating
to punishment. If evidence exists that would reduce the level of
punishment imposed on a defendant, that will help to better inform the
guilty plea.
It is important to note, however, that the white-collar defendant
will frequently proffer—i.e., give the government evidence of his or her
culpability—before the guilty plea.162 Because such proffers often occur
pre-indictment, especially in the white-collar context where
prosecutors are more willing to discuss the case pre-indictment,163
many white-collar defendants will have admitted culpability before any
Brady material would necessarily reach them even if the expansion of
Brady to plea bargaining were to be achieved. Although outside the
scope of this Comment, this may present an argument for an even
greater extension of the Brady right into the realm of pre-indictment
proffer agreements. The practice of proffering in white-collar crime
shows that Brady expansion to plea bargains would not solve all fairness
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See THE TRIAL PENALTY, supra note 14, at 343.
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160 441 F. Supp. 2d 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
161 See generally Mike Work, Creating Constitutional Procedure: Frye, Lafler, and Plea
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issues for white-collar defendants but would nonetheless be an
important step in the right direction.
Lastly, the availability of exculpatory evidence will also help to
assure that guilty pleas are entered into based upon actual guilt. The
aim of the prosecutor is that “guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer.”164 The expansion of Brady into the plea bargaining context
would have the effect of ensuring that the combined pressures
discussed in this article do not amount to a coercive dynamic where the
innocent white-collar defendant feels the need to plead guilty to escape
the mere possibility of a stiffer sentence after trial. While the possibility
of an innocent defendant pleading guilty is mentioned last in this article,
it is merely because such a possibility is a byproduct of the factors
discussed earlier. The discussion over substantive and procedural
rights in the criminal space should always express concern over finding
guilt and revealing innocence, and this Comment is so concerned.
VI. CONCLUSION
The need for the expansion of Brady material into the plea
bargaining context is paramount. Plea bargains constitute the vast
majority of criminal adjudications, and protections built to protect the
rights of defendants during trial cannot be blind to the fact that the jury
trial has receded to the background. To protect constitutional rights,
Brady rights must be transplanted into the plea bargaining context. The
white-collar crime arena has distinct considerations informing this
debate, and counseling in favor of the expansion, which should not be
ignored by those wishing to create that expansion. White-collar crime
criminalizes broad actus reus, thereby relying on mens rea and creating
a body of substantive law that may be even less favorable to defendants
than traditional criminal law. The intricate legal issues involved will
create an inordinately expensive defense. High sentencing guidelines
set the backdrop for this array of factors exerting pressure on a whitecollar defendant and prosecutor. This combination of pressures, unique
to the white-collar space, makes a white-collar defendant likely to plead
guilty, even though innocent. Expanding the Brady right to plea
bargaining would give the white-collar defendant a better
understanding of his or her defense and a better outlook on the realistic
opportunity for success at trial, diminishing the likelihood of a guilty
plea when, in fact, the defendant is innocent. Those wishing to make this

164 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111 (1976) (quoting Berger v. United States,
296 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
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system more just should use the white-collar context as an important
piece of their argument to expand Brady to plea bargaining.

